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Pearson correlation and mutual information based complex networks of the day-to-day returns
of US S&P500 stocks between 1985 and 2015 have been constructed in order to investigate the
mutual dependencies of the stocks and their nature. We show that both networks detect qualitative
differences especially during (recent) turbulent market periods thus indicating strongly fluctuating
interconnections between the stocks of different companies in changing economic environments. A
measure for the strength of nonlinear dependencies is derived using surrogate data and leads to
interesting observations during periods of financial market crises. In contrast to the expectation
that dependencies reduce mainly to linear correlations during crises we show that (at least in the
2008 crisis) nonlinear effects are significantly increasing. It turns out that the concept of centrality
within a network could potentially be used as some kind of an early warning indicator for abnormal
market behavior as we demonstrate with the example of the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. Finally,
we apply a Markowitz mean variance portfolio optimization and integrate the measure of nonlinear
dependencies to scale the investment exposure. This leads to significant outperformance as compared
to a fully invested portfolio.
PACS numbers: 05.45.Tp, 89.65.Gh, 89.75.Hc
I. INTRODUCTION
Investigating phenomena in the financial markets has
been becoming increasingly popular in the physics com-
munity. Econophysicists unfold a new perspective [1]
complimentary to traditional approaches in finance and
financial mathematics through leveraging the powerful
tools from statistical physics such as random matrix the-
ory [2] or agent based market models [3].
It is vital for various applications in finance to gain
a comprehensive understanding of how financial assets
move together, e.g. when assessing the risk associated
with a portfolio. In order to do so, it is common prac-
tice to express mutual dependencies of financial assets in
terms of the Pearson correlation coefficient of their return
time series.
Mantegna and Stanley [4] showed the power law scal-
ing behavior of the probability distribution of financial
indices. Hsieh [5] pointed out that returns of financial
assets are not autocorrelated while their absolute values
strongly are. Further studies pointed out the intermit-
tent behavior of financial time series and how they re-
semble phenomena that we know from turbulence [6, 7].
These results show the nonlinear nature of financial time
series and thus strongly indicate that linear measures for
correlations might not be sufficient to fully describe the
data.
∗ alexander.haluszczynski@gmail.com
Mantegna [8] first proposed the concept of Minimum
Spanning Trees (MST) based on linear correlations be-
tween stocks in order to analyze the hierarchical struc-
ture in financial markets. Further studies have been con-
ducted by e.g. Bonanno [9] or Naylor [10] who investi-
gated foreign exchange markets rather than stock mar-
kets. Onnela [11, 12] introduced the framework of a dy-
namically evolving MST.
We take this concept as a starting point and move on
in the following direction: Financial time series exhibit
nonlinearities and we aim to capture these effects when
analyzing correlation networks. Thus, we construct our
networks not only based on linear Pearson correlation but
based on mutual information which is sensitive to both
linear and nonlinear interrelationships. Mutual informa-
tion has been studied as a measure for mutual dependen-
cies in financial time series by e.g. Dionisio [13], Fedora
[14] and Darbellay [15]. However, a detailed comparison
of the properties of linear and nonlinear correlations in
financial time series has not yet been done.
In this paper, we show that substantial information is
lost by using a purely linear measure and propose an al-
ternative approach by choosing mutual information as a
measure that captures both linear and nonlinear correla-
tions. The use of surrogate data [16] allows us to create
time series with the linear properties conserved but all
the nonlinear properties destroyed. Thus we can com-
pare network-topological measures based on the original
and on the linearized surrogate time series and investi-
gate nonlinear dependencies. Furthermore, this enables
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2us to directly quantify the nonlinear correlations and de-
rive a quantitative measure for them. While many stud-
ies have investigated financial crises from an econophys-
ical perspective (e.g. Ref. [17–19]) we will specifically
work out the strength and influence of nonlinear corre-
lations during crises. In order to gain useful information
about the collective dynamics of the assets under study,
we create networks and apply different measures such as
centrality, normalized tree length and mean occupation
layer [11]. Finally, we apply the methods to portfolio
construction: An investment strategy will be presented
that takes into account nonlinear correlations in order to
scale the investment exposure, which leads to a signifi-
cant outperformance than compared to a fully invested
portfolio.
The article is organised as follows: Section II intro-
duces the data and methods used in our study. Section III
shows the analysis of the dependency matrices obtained
from both Pearson correlation and mutual information.
In section IV we present the main results obtained from
studying networks while we apply our methods to port-
folio construction in section V. Our summary and the
conclusions are given in section VI.
II. DATA, SIMILARITY MEASURES,
COMPLEX NETWORKS AND SURROGATES
A. Data
As in Onnela [11] we consider the U.S. stock market.
We choose a subset of stocks from the S&P500 Index
which represents the 500 highest capitalized and thus
most influential companies in the U.S.. Starting from
January 2nd 1985 our data consists of the daily clos-
ing prices of all stocks that “survived“ in the index until
December 31st 2015 in order to have a consistent stock
universe during the whole period. This comes to a total
of N = 152 time series with 7816 data points each. As
usual, the stock prices p have been converted to logarith-
mic returns x
xi,t = log pi,t − log pi,t−1 . (1)
In order to obtain dynamically evolving results, we di-
vide the data in a number of overlapping windows and
calculate our measure for each of the windows. Similar
to Ref. [11] we select a fixed-size sliding window of T =
1000 trading days which is equivalent to approximately
four years of data. The step size between two consecu-
tive windows is δT = 20 trading days. This ensures a
sufficient amount of data for the calculation of the mu-
tual information. The time series of our stocks are then
defined as Xi = {xi,1...xi,T }. The data used is publicly
available through yahoo finance [20].
Our time horizon is long enough to investigate a num-
ber of key market events. The data covers Black Monday
(October 19, 1987) when stock markets around the world
crashed for the first time after World War II. From 1997
FIG. 1. (a) Return time series, (b) autocorrelation function
of returns (blue) and absolute values of returns (green), (c)
phase map of Lincoln National Corporation (LNC) stock re-
turns. Phase map: Phases ϕ(l) are scattered against neigh-
boring phases ϕ(l + 1).
to 2001 the markets were subject to excessive speculation
and overvaluation of many technology companies which
led to the Dot-com bubble. The bubble bursted during
2002 with significant declines taking place in July and
September. Finally, our data includes the 2007/2008 sub-
prime mortgage crises. At that time the market declined
after its all time high in October 2007 and a crash oc-
curred after the collapse of Lehman Brothers on Septem-
ber 15, 2008. In addition, our considered time span also
includes a number of major global political events. These
include the fall of the Berlin wall on November 9, 1989,
which triggered the collapse of the Soviet Union as well
as the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2001.
B. Measures for Mutual Dependencies
1. Pearson Correlation Coefficient
The standard approach in finance to quantify mutual
dependencies between stocks is the Pearson correlation
coefficient ρ,
ρXi,Xj =
∑n
t=1(xi,t − x¯i)(xj,t − x¯j)√∑n
t=1(xi,t − x¯i)2
√∑n
t=1(xj,t − x¯j)2
, (2)
where xi are the stock returns of stock i and x¯i their
mean, respectively. It is bound to the interval [-1,1] and
allows to directly compare correlations of different asset
pairs as it is a normalized measure. A serious problem
with Pearson correlation, however, is that it only cap-
tures linear interrelationships.
32. Mutual Information
It is well known that financial time series exhibit non-
linear effects [5]. This is exemplified in Fig. 1. There we
show the time series, autocorrelation function and phase
map of the Lincoln National Corporation (LNC) stock.
Phase maps are sets of points G = {ϕ(l), ϕ(l+∆)} where
ϕ(l) is the lth mode of the Fourier transform
ϕ(l) = arg
T−1∑
t=0
xte
−2piitl/T (3)
and ∆ a mode delay with ∆ = 1 in this example. A ran-
dom uncorrelated distribution would lead to a random
distribution of points in the phase map. Here, we ob-
serve a significant stripe pattern. This clearly indicates
the presence of nonlinear effects in our stock returns data
[21]. Ra¨th et al. [22] already showed the presence of
such stripe pattern in the data of the Dow Jones index.
As we observed similar effects not only for the LNC ex-
ample, but also for the other stocks in our dataset we
conclude that phase correlations are a generic feature.
Furthermore, the autocorrelation of the returns immedi-
ately drops to zero which means that the time series does
not exhibit a linear memory. At the same time the auto-
correlation of the absolute values of the returns does not
drop to zero. There is no linear process that can generate
a behavior like this [5].
The consequence is the following: If there are nonlinear
effects present in financial time series, the purely linear
Pearson correlation coefficient captures only a fraction of
mutual dependencies and thus a significant amount of in-
formation is ignored. Hence it would be beneficial to use
a different measure that captures all kind of relationships
between two time series.
An appropriate solution to this problem is the use of
mutual information I˜(Xi, Yj) [23] as a measure for mu-
tual dependencies
I˜(Xi, Xj) =
∫ ∫
p(xi, xj) log
(
p(xi, xj)
p(xi)p(xj)
)
dxidxj , (4)
where p(xi, xj) is the joint probability density function
and p(xi), p(xj) the marginal PDFs respectively. This
is because mutual information is sensitive to both linear
and nonlinear correlations. Alternatively one can express
mutual information through the marginal- and joint en-
tropies of the two variables
I˜(Xi, Xj) = H(Xi) +H(Xj)−H(Xi, Xj) . (5)
H(Xi) denotes the entropy of variable Xi and is defined
as
H(Xi) = −
∑
xi
p(xi) log(p(xi)) , (6)
while the joint entropy H(Xi, Xj) of variables Xi and Xj
reads
H(Xi, Xj) = −
∑
xi
∑
xj
p(xi, xj) log(p(xi, xj)) . (7)
We switched here to the discrete formulation using sums
instead of integrals. This has a very important reason:
Mutual Information is not a normalised measure and thus
it can take on values between zero and infinity. For dis-
crete variables one can normalize mutual information [24]
in the interval [0,1] where 0 means that both variables do
not share any information and 1 means completely iden-
tical probability distributions
I(Xi, Xj) =
I˜(Xi, Xj)√
H(Xi)H(Xj)
. (8)
We use binning methods to estimate the probability den-
sity function in order to ensure normalizability. Heuris-
tically we find d√T/4 e to be a good choice for the num-
ber of bins which leads to 16 in our case of window size
T = 1000. We are aware that alternative methods like
kernel density or nearest neighbour based estimators [23]
would give a better approximation of the probability dis-
tributions. However, this would lead to the problem of
not normalizable mutual information.
C. Network Construction
As first proposed in Mantegna [8] the concept of graphs
and more specifically Minimum Spanning Trees is very
useful in order to summarize the vast amount of infor-
mation stored in correlation matrices. We choose the
MST as the main type of network to analyze due to its
simplicity. Here the concept is to connect N nodes (as-
sets) by N-1 edges under the constraint that distances are
minimal and hence dependencies maximal. We construct
MSTs by using Prim’s algorithm [25]. The advantage of
the MST in comparison to other types of networks is that
we do not need to choose any parameters. Instead, it
emerges automatically and thus ensures comparability.
Using the two different measures from section II B, we
aim to investigate the dynamical evolution [11] of graphs
that capture only the linear or both the linear and non-
linear correlations. The results are then compared and
we analyze during which market periods we observe dif-
ferences between the measures.
Before we are able to construct networks we need to
convert the correlation and mutual information matri-
ces to distance matrices in each time step t by using
an appropriate metric. For mutual information this is
straightforward by applying
dMI,tXi,Xj = 1− It(Xi, Xj) (9)
to the normalized mutual information.
As Pearson’s correlation coefficient can also take on
negative values, we have to transform it to a non-negative
distance measure. For this we use the transformation
dcorr,tXi,Xj =
√
2(1− ρtXi,Xj ) (10)
as discussed in Onnela [11] which fulfills all requirements
for a distance metric. When comparing Eq. (9) and
4FIG. 2. Left: Mean (a) and variance (c) of the coefficients of the Pearson correlation based distance matrix calculated in each
time step. Right: Mean (b) and variance (d) based on the mutual information of the original series (blue) and the average
distance matrix of all surrogate realizations (cyan). Plus/minus one sigma error ranges (grey) are drawn for the surrogate
realizations, however, errors are so small that one can barely seen them.
Eq. (10) we observe that both distance metrics behave
differently if time series are linearly anti-correlated, i.e.
when their Pearson correlation coefficient is negative.
However, in our case all stock time series are positively
correlated in terms of Pearson correlation, which is typi-
cally the case in stock markets. If there were negatively
correlated time series, one could avoid this problem by
e.g. taking the absolute value of the Pearson correlation
when calculating the distance. We can now construct
MSTs T t in each time step t based on the two depen-
dency measures.
In addition, we also construct so called threshold net-
works where we only keep connections between nodes
with a distance less than a certain threshold. Heuris-
tically we find a threshold of 20% to be an appropriate
value i.e. connecting assets with the smallest 20% of dis-
tances and thus highest correlations.
D. Surrogates
When using mutual information as a measure for mu-
tual dependencies we capture both linear and nonlinear
correlations. In order to analyze the effects that are due
to nonlinear dependencies we need to separate linear and
nonlinear contributions.
Surrogate data allow us to exactly achieve this sepa-
ration by destroying nonlinear effects of the time series
while keeping all linear properties [16]. In this study we
use so called Fourier transform (FT) surrogates where
we Fourier transform the time series and thus separate all
linear properties into the amplitudes while the nonlinear
properties are stored in the phases. By adding uniformly
distributed random numbers to the Fourier phases we de-
stroy all nonlinear properties while the linear ones stay
untouched. An inverse Fourier transformation gives us
then the final surrogate data
x∗k(t) = F−1{X˜(f)} = F−1{X(f)eiφk(f)} . (11)
Equation (11) defines the k -th surrogate realization. We
create K = 20 realizations and average over the measures
calculated for each realization in order to get a more sta-
ble result. F−1 denotes the inverse Fourier transform
operator and eiφk(f) the k-th set of uniformly distributed
random phases that is added to the Fourier transform
X(f) of the original time series X. Prichard and Theiler
[26] showed that it is also possible to conserve the Pear-
son correlations by adding the same set of random num-
bers onto the phases of all time series. This is because the
Fourier transformed Pearson correlation depends only on
the phase differences between time series, which is then
unaffected.
We would like to point out that we do not do a rank-
ordered remapping of the data onto a Gaussian distribu-
tion at the beginning of the procedure. Thus we test for
static and dynamic nonlinearities at the same time. Con-
verting prices to logarithmic returns could potentially in-
duce static nonlinearities. We convinced ourselves that
the results presented later would not change much after
performing the above mentioned remapping. Thus, we
conclude that the results are mainly driven by dynamic
nonlinearities.
5III. ANALYSIS OF DEPENDENCY MATRICES
A. Distance Matrix Coefficients
Before constructing networks we first examine the dy-
namical evolution of the distribution of the distance ma-
trix coefficients based on Pearson correlation and mutual
information. In case of the surrogates we average over all
k realizations
MmSurro = 〈Mm{dMI
∗
k }〉k , (12)
whereMm is the m-th moment of the distribution of the
coefficients from the distance matrix dMI
∗
k obtained from
the k -th surrogate realization.
Figure (2) shows the dynamically evolving mean and
variance of the distance matrices based on Pearson cor-
relation and mutual information. As we expect, the re-
sulting moments based on the Pearson correlation of the
original and surrogate time series are exactly identical per
construction. For mutual information, however, we note
that the results of the surrogates are more similar to the
Pearson correlation based results. The mean mutual in-
formation based distance of both the original time series
and the surrogate series evolves very similarly until the
2008 financial crisis. However, starting from November
2008 the mean based on the original time series becomes
lower than the surrogate based average. Since less dis-
tance means higher average mutual information we con-
clude that nonlinear effects lead to stronger dependencies
among the time series triggered by the 2008 financial cri-
sis. The strength of nonlinear correlations further grows
throughout the European debt crisis until reaching its
peak in the middle of 2012. This result is a little sur-
prising as it disagrees with the expectation that inter-
dependencies reduce mainly to linear correlations during
crises. It is interesting to notice that the variance of the
distance matrix coefficients (lower row of Fig. (2)) be-
FIG. 3. Average significance coefficient χsig(Xi) of each asset
- Red line: Global average over all individual assets.
haves slightly different. Nonlinear effects are increasing
the variance starting from the onset of the Dot-com bub-
ble in 1998 and amplify throughout the whole remaining
period. Taking into account both moments of the dis-
tance matrices we can already see that nonlinear effects
are clearly present even at a very general level of analysis.
B. Deriving Nonlinear Dependencies
In order to explicitly express the significance of non-
linear correlations we derive a significance measure χsig
by first calculating the mutual information matrix of all
surrogate realizations. We then take the average over all
surrogate realizations and subtract it from the mutual
information matrix of the original time series
χsig(Xi, Xj) =
I(Xi, Xj)− 〈I(X∗i,k, X∗j,k)〉k
σI∗
. (13)
Finally, we normalize it by the standard deviation of the
surrogate realizations σI∗ . Figure 3 shows the time evo-
lution of the column averages of the significance matrix,
which represent the significance of the mean nonlinear
interaction of one stock with all others
χsig(Xi) = 〈χsig(Xi, Xj)〉j . (14)
It clearly shows that the 2008 crisis triggers strong non-
linear effects, which we do not see during the early 90s
recession or other turbulent market phases like the Dot-
com crisis. The period of uncertainty starting in the end
of 2009 caused by the European sovereign debt crisis fur-
ther amplifies the significance of nonlinear interactions
FIG. 4. Significance matrices χsig; Lower half: Calm market
environment in November 1998, Upper half: Turbulent mar-
ket environment in May 2009 after the crash triggered by the
Lehman collapse on September 15, 2008. Labels denote stock
indices.
6and only slowly declines towards the present. The high-
est significance values are achieved by Lincoln National
Corporation (insurance and investments) and Citigroup
(financial services) in May 2009 shortly after stock prices
bottomed in the course of the financial crisis.
By taking the absolute value of the difference between
mutual information of the original data and the aver-
age of the surrogate realizations and dividing it by the
original mutual information we define a measure for the
strength of overall nonlinear correlations
ζnlc(Xi, Xj) =
∣∣∣I(Xi, Xj)− 〈I(X∗i,k, X∗j,k)〉k∣∣∣
I(Xi, Xj)
, (15)
which we will later use in the portfolio optimization sec-
tion. It tells us, which amount of the overall mutual in-
formation is due to nonlinear mutual dependencies. How-
ever, it is not entirely clear what the meaning of “negative
nonlinearities” would be, i.e. when the average mutual
information of all surrogate realizations takes a higher
value than the original one. This would correspond to
saying that after destroying nonlinear effects, both time
series share more information than before. We see in
Fig. 3 that there are certain periods in time where the
mutual dependencies of original and surrogate time se-
ries are almost identical and hence only linear correla-
tions play a role. The lower half of Fig. 4 shows the
significance matrix at a rather calm market period in
November 1998. In contrast, the upper half shows sig-
nificantly higher significance values in the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis in May 2009. Darker red stripes
indicate particularly strong nonlinear correlations of one
asset with all others as for e.g. Lincoln National Corpo-
ration (LNC), Citigroup (C) and General Electric (GE).
IV. NETWORK-BASED ANALYSIS
1. Normalized Tree Length
As the next step, MSTs have been constructed from
the Pearson correlation and mutual information based
distance matrices using Prim’s algorithm [25]. First of
all, we take a look at the normalized tree length [11] in
Fig. 5 which is defined as
L(t) =
1
N − 1
∑
dtXi,Xj
∈ T t
dtXi,Xj , (16)
where t denotes the time step in which the MST has been
constructed. We notice that the qualitative behavior is
very similar to the mean of the distance matrix elements.
However, in the case of mutual information, there is a
gap emerging between original time series and surrogate
based trees already in the middle of 1998. This is when
the Dot-com bubble slowly started growing. This hap-
pens earlier than compared to the average of all distance
elements in Fig. 2.
2. Mean Occupation Layer
Another interesting property of the networks we attend
to from Ref. [11] is the dynamic mean occupation layer
l(t, vc) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
L(vti) , (17)
where L(vti) denotes the level of node vi at time step t.
The level L(vti) measures the distance of node vi from
the central vertex in terms of absolute numbers of edges.
Thus the mean occupation layer reflects the average dis-
tance of nodes from the center of the network. The center
is dynamically determined in each time step based on de-
gree centrality which we are explaining in the following
section. We can interpret the mean occupation layer as
a measure for the diversification potential within the set
of our stocks. As shown in Fig. 6, the result based on
the linear measure (a) indicates that the mean distance
from the center of the network increases during financial
bubbles. It peaks in June 2008 and thus shortly before
the crash occurred as well as during the Dot-com bub-
ble in 2001. Figure 6 (b) demonstrates that the results
based on Pearson correlation and mutual information of
the linearized surrogate time series evolve very similarly.
However, the lower plot (c) where we compare the mu-
tual information based result between the original and
surrogate time series exhibits the following interesting
features. During the Dot-com bubble and its subsequent
crash the surrogate data yields a higher mean occupa-
tion layer as compared to the results based on the origi-
nal time series. This means that linear correlations lead
to stronger diversification and thus we could state that
linear correlations are dominating the topology of the
network during the Dot-com crash. In contrast, the be-
havior during the 2008 financial crisis is different. The
FIG. 5. Top: Normalized Tree Length of Pearson correlation
based MST. Bottom: Same for mutual information of original
data (blue) and surrogates (cyan).
7FIG. 6. (a) Dynamic mean occupation layer of Pearson correlation based MST. (b) Mutual Information of surrogate series
(cyan) vs. Pearson correlation based result (red). (c) Same for mutual information of original series (blue) and surrogates
(cyan) with plus/minus one sigma error range in grey. Vertical lines indicate the bursting of the Dot-com bubble in March
2000 and the acceleration of the crash after the Lehman Brothers collapse on September 15, 2008.
original time series mean occupation layer drops below
the surrogate layer in the beginning of 2008. However,
the sharp decline in stock prices after the Lehman col-
lapse in September 2007 triggered a substantial increase
in the original time series layer. It further grows dur-
ing the aftermath of the crisis and peaks in the middle
of 2010. Here it reaches a level of around 11.5 which is
almost twice as high as the level of the surrogate based
layer and thus indicates that the nonlinear tree diver-
sifies significantly stronger. This shows that the 2008
financial crisis and the Dot-com crash have a different
character, as we did not observe similar effects during
the latter. Further support for this observation is pro-
vided by Fig. 3 where we see that nonlinear correlations
are weak during the Dot-com period but strongly grow
starting in early 2008 - before the crash occurred. We
observe similar effects later on in section V where we ap-
ply a portfolio optimization strategy, which is based on
nonlinear correlations.
3. Centrality
We use the concept of degree centrality to determine
how central and thus important a stock is in our net-
works. Degree centrality
degi(t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
D(dtXi,Xj ) (18)
of stock i simply counts the number of connections to
other stocks where D(dtXi,Xj ) = 1 if dtXi,Xj > 0 which
mean that stocks Xi and Xj are connected and 0 else.
In Fig. 7 we can see a dynamical overview of the most
central stocks in our networks. In general, the dominat-
ing assets in terms of degree centrality are very similar
in both correlation and mutual information based net-
works. However, the results based on mutual informa-
tion show more fluctuations especially from 1994 to 1997
and from 2005 until 2012. Until 2000, General Electric
(GE) was by far the most central element. This could
be driven by GE’s important role in the US economy be-
ing a broadly diversified company and one of the largest
employers. Furthermore, GE’s large market capitaliza-
tion was further increasing until the second half of 2000
(Source: Bloomberg). However, in the course of the Dot-
com bubble and its subsequent crash from 2000 until 2002
GE’s market capitalization rapidly dropped and at the
FIG. 7. Assets with the highest degree centrality. Top: Pear-
son correlation based; Bottom: Original mutual information
(blue) and surrogate mutual information (green) based.
8FIG. 8. Degree centrality of JPM based on Pearson corre-
lation (a) and mutual information (b) (blue: original data,
green: surrogate data) vs. network avg. (red). The vertical
lines indicate the peak of the stock prices on October 15, 2007
after which they began falling as well as the acceleration of
the crash after Lehman Brothers collapsed on September 15,
2008.
same time it’s importance in the network in terms of
degree centrality. Instead, PPG Industries – a chemi-
cals and specialty materials supplier – emerged as the
most central node in both correlation and mutual infor-
mation based networks lasting until late 2006. From then
on J.P.Morgan (JPM) emerged as the most central node
in all networks, which is particularly interesting in the
course of the 2008 financial crisis. JPM’s centrality grew
excessively and peaked in late 2006 as shown in Fig. 8
— long before the subprime bubble started bursting in
October 2007. In the course of the stock market crash
the centrality then rapidly declined towards the global
network average in early 2009. In the following analysis
we will focus on the time between 1998 and 2010 since
the most interesting phenomena occur here. In order to
gain additional insights about the role of JPM we also
construct a threshold network where we simply connect
the pairs of nodes with the highest 20% of dependency
coefficients. There we observe similar effects in the clus-
tering coefficient of JPM during the same periods. The
clustering coefficient
ci(t) =
1
degi(t)(degi(t)− 1)
∑
jk
(w˜ijw˜jkw˜ik)
1/3 (19)
describes the transitivity of JPM where w˜ij =
wij/max(w) denotes normalized edge weight of node i
and j [27]. A high clustering coefficient means that neigh-
bours of JPM are highly connected while a low clustering
coefficient means that they tend to not have connections.
As shown in Fig. 9, the clustering coefficient of JPM
FIG. 9. Clustering coefficient of JPM (blue) vs. network avg.
(red) for Pearson correlation (a), original mutual information
(b) and surrogate mutual information (c).
starts moving away from the global network average in
2005 and declines until mid of 2007. Together with the
centrality increasing during the same time period we can
interpret this the following way: During the growth of
the subprime bubble, JPM as America’s largest financial
institution takes on an increasingly important role in the
network. At the same time the clustering coefficient de-
creases and indicates that there are fewer connection be-
tween JPM’s neighbours making JPM the “driving force”
in the network. More interestingly, all this happens long
before the crash occurs with strong deviations from the
average network state emerging very early. This could
mean that JPM acts as kind of an early warning sys-
tem, which is signaling through centrality and clustering
measures that the financial markets in the US show ab-
normal behavior. Furthermore, we found that the same
effects occurred during the Dot-com bubble and its sub-
sequent crash around 2001/2002 and somewhat weaker
during the early 90s recession (results not shown).
When comparing the Pearson correlation based mea-
sures to the mutual information based measures we ob-
serve that in the latter case the effects are qualitatively
stronger articulated. In Fig. 8 (b) we present the mutual
information based results for the degree centrality. Com-
pared to the measures based on the original time series,
the quantitative strength of the degree centrality is sig-
nificantly lower for the surrogate data. Moreover, both
centrality measures begin their most significant drop in
October 2007, which is exactly when the stock markets
started moving downwards after peaking. However, cen-
trality measures of the networks constructed from the
mutual information based on the original time series are
rapidly falling after their peak in October 2006 and thus
around one year before the stock market crisis started.
9Measure Base MeasureM I(original) 〈I(surrogate)〉 σ(I(surrogate))
Distance Matrix Mean 0.958 0.992 4.50× 10−5
Distance Matrix Variance 0.839 0.845 5.29× 10−4
Distance Matrix Skewness 0.925 0.947 1.04× 10−3
Distance Matrix Kurtosis 0.886 0.891 2.34× 10−3
Minimum Spanning Tree Normalized Tree Length 0.977 0.992 7.78× 10−5
Minimum Spanning Tree Betweenness Centrality 0.767 0.908 0.017
Minimum Spanning Tree Mean Occupation Layer 0.594 0.830 0.033
TABLE I. In each time step we calculate the above measures based on Pearson correlation as well as mutual information of
the original and surrogate time series. Here we show the Pearson correlation coefficients of the resulting set of values based on
linear Pearson correlation with: 1. The results based on the mutual information of the original data denoted by I(original)
2. The results based on the mutual information of the surrogate data denoted by 〈I(surrogate)〉 where we averaged over the
results of all surrogate realizations. σ(I(surrogate)) is their standard deviation respectively.
When comparing the results of the original time series
to the surrogate results we observe that there is a sharp
decline from the centrality peak in October 2006 until
October 2007, which is only happening in the measures
for the original series. This indicates that JPM’s cen-
trality is influenced by strong nonlinear effect during this
period. From October 2007 until September 2008 central-
ity grows again — this corresponds to the period where
stocks started to fall after their all time high in October
2007. When stock prices drop even faster in September
2008 after the investment bank Lehman Brothers went
bankrupt, JPMorgan’s centrality suddenly decreases as
well. We would like to mention that we observed similar
behavior for Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers in a
different set of data (results not shown).
Table (I) summarizes different network and distance
matrix measures and shows how similar both the Pearson
correlation and the mutual information based results are
in terms of the Pearson correlation coefficient of their re-
sulting sets of values. Values close to unity signify a close
similarity of the Pearson correlation and mutual informa-
tion based results. We observe that the surrogate mutual
information and Pearson correlation based results have a
higher similarity than the original data mutual informa-
tion and Pearson correlation based results. Thus there
are nonlinear correlations present and surrogate data is
a good method for comparison when using mutual infor-
mation as a measure for mutual dependencies.
Unlike during the periods of financial crises mentioned
above, we do not observe effects during major political
events such as the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989
or the 9/11 attacks in September 2001. Neither the mean
occupation layer nor the normalized tree length indicates
significant changes in market correlation structure.
V. PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION
A. Markowitz Portfolio Construction
To make use of our concepts we apply them to the
problem of portfolio construction. A standard approach
in finance is the mean-variance optimization developed
by Harry Markowitz in 1952 [28] where the variance of a
portfolio is minimized given a certain target return or risk
aversion factor. The expected return µP of the portfolio
P then is
µP = E[P (w)] =
∑
i
wiE[Xi], (20)
where wi is the weight and E[Xi] denotes the expected
return of asset i. The expected return of each asset is
assumed to be its median during the historical time win-
dow T = 1000 after excluding outliers by applying an
interquartile range based filter. This is not a very good
approximation because the autocorrelation function of
the returns quickly falls towards zero and hence past re-
turns do not tell much about the future. For the sake
of simplicity, however, we decided to use this standard
approach. The variance of our portfolio is then given by
σ2P (w) =
∑
i
∑
j
wiwjσXiσXjρXi,Xj , (21)
where σXi is the standard deviation of the returns of
asset i and ρXi,Xj the Pearson correlation coefficient of
assets i and j. The expression σXiσXjρXi,Xj is also called
covariance σXi,Xj while we denote the covariance matrix
of all assets as Σ. The optimal portfolio described by
the weight vector w given some target return µP is then
obtained by minimizing
wTΣ w (22)
subject to
µP = R
Tw (23)
and ∑
i
wi = 1, (24)
where RT is the vector of the expected returns of the as-
sets. Now we are left with one more decision: Which tar-
get return should we select for our portfolio optimization?
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FIG. 10. Backtest results: Portfolio value (starting at 1 at
t = 0) for fixed allocation (red), fully invested max sharp
ratio portfolio (blue) and NLC scaled portfolio (green).
To ensure a consistent strategy we construct Markowitz
optimized portfolios for all possible target returns and
then choose the one where the fraction of portfolio re-
turn and volatility µP
σ2P (w)
is the largest — the so called
maximum sharpe ratio portfolio. We do not allow short
selling in this example which means that asset weights
wi have to be positive.
B. Nonlinear Correlations (NLC) Scaled Strategy
Having understood that there are significant nonlinear
correlations present in stock market returns, naturally
the question arises how we can make practical use of this
knowledge. When it comes to portfolio optimization it is
common standard to describe mutual interrelationships
of assets through their Pearson correlation coefficients.
As outlined above, a significant fraction of the infor-
mation about mutual dependencies of stocks can be of
nonlinear nature and hence is not captured by the linear
Pearson coefficient. In times when nonlinear correlations
are low, the linear correlation matrix captures most
of the information and hence is a good estimator for
interdependencies. When nonlinear correlations are
high, however, a significant amount of information is
missing and thus making it a bad estimator. The idea
is now to perform a classical Markowitz optimization
and chose the maximum sharp ratio portfolio as our
benchmark portfolio. The alternative strategy takes the
same relative allocation but allows for an additional
asset: Cash. We allow cash weights from -100% to 100%.
A weight of -100% means we allow borrowing money in
order to increase the investment exposure. For example,
imagine we invest 1000$ in our benchmark portfolio. A
cash weight of -100% in the alternative strategy then
means that we borrow another 1000$ in order to increase
the investment exposure to 2000$. In contrast, 100%
FIG. 11. Upper plot: Portfolio weights — S&P 500 Index
(green), Merrill Lynch US Corporate Index (red) and Merrill
Lynch US Treasury Index (blue). Lower plot: Cash weights
based on NLC strategy.
cash weight in the alternative strategy means that we
only hold cash and do not invest into other assets i.e.
have an investment exposure of 0$. The cash weight is
determined by a nonlinearity score snlc, which includes
the following measures:
1. Absolute strength of nonlinear correlations
s1(t) = 〈ζnlc(Xi, Xj , t)〉i,j for i 6= j . (25)
2. Nonlinear correlations versus a 24 time steps rolling
window mean which corresponds to around two years
s2(t) =
1
24
t∑
t∗=t−24
s1(t
∗) . (26)
3. Change of nonlinear correlations versus a three time
step rolling window corresponding to one quarter
s3(t) =
s1(t)
s1(t− 3) − 1 (27)
The idea here is to not only use the strength of non-
linear correlations in the current time step but also re-
flect how they compare to a rolling mid-term average.
In addition, we incorporate how the strength of nonlin-
ear correlations changed within the last three months.
The reason is that we want to capture the beginning of
turbulent market periods as well as to achieve a market
re-entry after turbulent periods are over and markets re-
cover. The above measures are converted to scores as
shown in Table II using a nonlinear mapping. The abso-
lute strength of nonlinear correlations s1(t) translates to
the most defensive score s∗1(t) = 0 if s1(t) ≥ 0.25. This
means that on average 25% or more of the mutual in-
formation of the assets is of nonlinear nature. Likewise,
if the strength of nonlinear correlations s1(t) exceeds its
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0 ≤ s1(t) < 0.1 0.1 ≤ s1(t) < 0.15 0.15 ≤ s1(t) < 0.2 0.2 ≤ s1(t) < 0.25 0.25 ≤ s1(t)
s∗1(t) 100 75 50 25 0
0 ≤ s1(t) < 12s2(t) 12s2(t) ≤ s1(t) < 34s2(t) 34s2(t) ≤ s1(t) < 2120s2(t) 2120s2(t) ≤ s1(t) < 2320s2(t) 2320s2(t) ≤ s1(t)
s∗2(t) 100 75 50 25 0
s3(t) ≤ −0.02 −0.02 ≤ s3(t) < 0 0 ≤ s3(t) < 0.02 0.02 ≤ s3(t) < 0.05 0.05 ≤ s3(t) < 0
s∗3(t) 25 10 0 −10 −100
TABLE II. Conversion of portfolio scoring measures s1(t), s2(t), s3(t) to scores s
∗
1(t), s
∗
2(t), s
∗
3(t) .
two-year moving average s2(t) by 0.15 or more, the score
s∗2(t) takes on its most defensive value s
∗
2(t) = 0. We
built the scoring model such that a strong increase in
s3(t) has a larger impact (-100) on the score s
∗
3(t) than
a strong decrease (+25). This is because firmly growing
nonlinear correlations might be a sign for turbulent mar-
ket periods and in this case we would like to have high
cash weights. All three measures are equally weighted
and bounded between 0 and 100
s˜nlc(t) =
1
3
(s∗1(t) + s
∗
2(t) + s
∗
3(t)) (28)
snlc(t) = max{min{s˜nlc(t), 100}, 0} . (29)
The cash weight of portfolio is then determined by
wcash(t) =
1
100
(100− 2snlc(t)) . (30)
Hence, if nonlinear correlations are stronger, the linear
correlation matrix captures less information about de-
pendencies and thus the strategy leads to a more de-
fensive allocation (higher cash exposure) and vice versa.
The strategy likewise worked for different parameter
choices but we decided to focus on the simple equally
weighted method presented above. We use a 500 day
sliding window for the calculation of ζnlc(Xi, Xj , t) and
the covariance matrix for the Markowitz optimization in
order to better capture changing market environments.
In order to test our strategy we selected a simple setup
of three indices plus cash: Merrill Lynch US Corpo-
rate Index LOC (US Corporate Bond Index), Merrill
Lynch US Treasury Index USD unhedged (US Govern-
ment Bond Index), S&P 500 Index (US Equity Index)
and BBA LIBOR USD 1 Month (USD Cash Rate). The
reason for not taking the large subset of stocks from the
S&P 500 Index we used in the first part of the study is
that we achieve a more stable allocation over time in this
simple example which is easier to interpret. When taking
a large portfolio universe the allocations would tend to
change a lot in each time step. Besides that we would
like to have less risky assets than stocks in our portfolio
universe such as US Government Bonds in order to see if
our strategy achieves the right allocations during differ-
ent market periods. We choose the indices above because
they reflect a large amount of the US credit, government
bonds and stock market.
We then ran a backtest from 1988 until 2016 per-
forming a Markowitz optimization and portfolio rebal-
ancing every 20 time steps. Figure 10 shows the devel-
opment of the fully invested zero cash portfolio (blue),
a strategic asset allocation with constant 25% Corporate
Bonds, 25% Government Bonds and 50% Equities (SAA
– red) and finally our strategy with dynamic cash weights
(green). In Fig. 11 we see that our strategy leads to 100%
cash weight from September 2008 until February 2009
and thus achieved a safe allocation just before the crash
commenced. We notice that the strategy outperforms the
zero cash strategy by 62% and the fixed allocation even
by 161%. However, we have to account for the higher in-
vestment exposure of 120% on average corresponding to
minus 20% cash leverage. For this we ran another back-
test where we set a constant cash weight of minus 20%.
It turns out that our NLC strategy still outperforms by
around 18%. Thus we conclude that this outperformance
is not driven by higher risk due to a higher investment
exposure but the dynamics of the nonlinear correlations
signal itself.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this study we analyzed nonlinear correlations in
multidimensional financial time series by using mutual
information as a measure for both linear and nonlinear
dependencies and the method of surrogate data. In the
first step we compared the moments of distance matrix
coefficients obtained from mutual information to the re-
sults based on Pearson correlation. We found that es-
pecially during turbulent market periods e.g. the 2008
crisis both results show qualitative differences and hence
indicate significant nonlinear correlations. This stands
in contrast to the expectation that during crises depen-
dencies reduce mainly to linear correlations. Then we
constructed Minimum Spanning Trees and equivalently
found differences in the network topology between the
linear and nonlinear measure. It turned out that the
average distance from the center of the network is signif-
icantly lower during periods of crises when considering
nonlinear correlations. Furthermore, the center of the
network in terms of degree centrality itself is more stable
and less fluctuating in the linear case. We showed that
the centrality of J.P.Morgan grew extensively long before
the subprime mortgage bubble crashed in 2008. To in-
vestigate if such kind of measures could potentially act as
an early warning indicator we will analyze the dynamics
of the average centrality of industrial sectors in further
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studies. It is very interesting to understand that there
are different types of financial crises in terms of nonlinear
effects. The results of our study indicate that during the
2008 crisis nonlinear effects were significantly stronger
than in preceding crises. Furthermore, we found that
major political events seem to have no significant mid-
and long-term impact on market correlation structure in
contrast to financial crises. Finally, after understanding
that there are significant nonlinear correlations present in
stock returns we developed a practical application in the
field of portfolio optimization. We showed that scaling
the investment exposure based on the strength of non-
linear correlations leads to significant outperformance as
compared to a fully invested portfolio. More direct ap-
plications of this knowledge will be explored in further
studies.
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